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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee ) Case No. 20050153 
Vs. 
Joshua Herschi, Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. This appeal is taken under Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, Sections 77-1-6(g) and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE 
SEARCH WAS REASONABLE AND LEGAL. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE 
APPLIED THE LAW THAT STATES: THE OFFICERS FAILED TO ADHERE 
TO THE KNOCK AND WAIT RULE WHEN THEIR RUSE TO GAIN 
PEACEABLE ENTRY FAILED 
1. Issue has been preserved for appeal T.P. 17 Lines 10-17. 
"That's it. When they pushed the door open against some 
force that was a breaking, when it was not preceded by an 
announcement, a purpose and identity and a reasonable time. 
Those are the two factors that they have to have preceding a 
breaking or forcing of the door. That is the critical issue in 
this case, whether or not there was announcement of purpose 
and identity and a reasonable amount of time before forcing a 
closed door." 
2. The Court should review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress in a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual 
determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and reviewing its legal 
conclusions for correctness. See State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v Godina-Luna. 826 
P.2d 652, 654 (Utah app. 1992); State v Vigil. 815 p.2d 1296,1290 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant entered a guilty plea to the information reserving his right to appeal 
R.207. He appeals the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure. R.240. He contests 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police 
officers failure to properly Knock and Announce before entering the apartment of the 
Defendant. R. 178 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of January 6, 2004, Defendant was in his apartment located at 408 
West 100 South, North Unit TLW, Logan, Utah. His girlfriend, Brooke Staggie was in 
the kitchen preparing supper. Defendant was in the living room rocking their 2-month-old 
daughter, Taya in a rocking chair. At approximately 8:30 p.m. there was a knock on the 
door. The Defendant called out while still sitting in the rocking chair, "Who is it?" to 
which he received a response, "Dennis." Being confused as who Dennis might be, he 
called out a second time, "Who is it?" Again the response was "Dennis." T.P.5 Line 1-9. 
This further confused the Defendant, not knowing a Dennis, he supposed that someone 
had the wrong apartment and got up out of the rocking chair, still holding the baby in his 
arms and went over and opened the door about four inches. Upon cracking open the door, 
the Defendant saw many men in his front yard. It is disputed as to whether or not the 
police officers announced their authority and purpose at this time. It is undisputed that 
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what happened next was the officers forced their way into the Defendant's home with 
such force that the Defendant had to cover the baby's head to keep it from being hit by 
the door T.P.8 Line 10-17. It is the Defendant's claim that at no time did he recognize or 
hear that the men who were forcing their way into his home were police officers serving a 
search warrant. T.P.3. Line 1-25. See Addendum D and G. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police officers when executing the search warrant tried to deceive the defendant 
to gain access to his home. When the "Ruse" or "Deception" failed, they resorted to force 
their way into the Defendant's castle. 
The trial court completely failed to address the issue of the "Ruse" used by the 
deceptive police officer. The officers should have adhered to the "knock and wait" 
principle when their ruse to gain peaceable entry failed. 
ARGUMENT 
Entry by means of a ruse is permitted if no force is used. In other words, the ruse 
will only be permitted if successful. When the ruse employed is unsuccessful and the 
officers do not gain peaceable entry, then the "knock and wait" rule must then be 
observed, absent exigent circumstances. State v Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 584 P.2s 428 
(1978). 
Whether legal entry is gained by force under the "knock and wait" rule depends on 
all the circumstances including the existence of exigent conditions which excuse the 
compliance with the statute. The purpose of the "knock and announce" rule has been 
stated in State vDugger. 12 Wn. App. 74, 528 P.2d 274 (1974) at page 78: 
(1) it reduces the potential for violence to both the police officers and the occupants of 
the house into which entry is sought; (2) it guards against the needless destruction of 
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private property; and (3) it symbolizes the respect for individual privacy summarized in 
the adage that "a man's house is his castle." 
Because the uniform of the officer was covered by a jacket, and the Defendant 
didn't see the badge that the officer claims was on that jacket, the Defendant was 
afforded no time to form a judgment before the officers forced their way into his 
residence. The Defendant was faced with a situation resembling that in State v Bresolin, 
13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2D 1394, in which robbers entered a house falsely claiming to 
be federal agents. 
The circumstances of this confrontation make it understandable that a person in the 
Defendant's position might instinctively close the door. In the case State v Lowrie, 12 
Wn. App. 155, 528 P.2d 1010 (1974), the court found that in the absence of exigent 
circumstances, it is not enough to announce as the forceful entry in made. Immediate 
forceful entry is particularly offensive, and indeed dangerous, when the only reasonably 
visible officers are, or are perceived to be in plain clothes. A prominently posted 
uniformed officer is a great aid in establishing the legitimacy of the supposedly 
announced identification, particularly when it comes at late hours as the situation in this 
case. 
There were no exigent circumstances justifying the officer's conduct. There was no 
running or scurrying about indicating the attempted destruction of evidence. Thus the 
officers had the responsibility to employ the "knock and wait" rule. An examination of 
the federal authorities leads to the same conclusion. The closing of a door upon officers 
not in uniform, which was the Defendant's impression, does not excuse compliance with 
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the rule requiring announcement BEFORE forceful entry. Miller v United States, 357 
U.S. 301, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, 78 S Ct. 1190 (1958). 
The Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah app. 1994) that 
an unjustified violation of the "knock and announce" statute constitutes a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and warrants suppression of any evidence obtained as a result. The 
Court of Appeals specifically held that where there is no legitimate justification for a 
violation of the statute, a Defendant is not required to demonstrate a factual basis for 
damage pursuant to any violation of any interests protected by the statute. Id. at 412. 
A failure to "knock and announce" can only be justified if there are exigent 
circumstances. Exigent circumstances might include a reasonable fear for officer safety 
or a reasonable fear that there is a legitimate concern for destruction of evidence. Id. 412-
13. 
This case might well be likened to another c^se where an officer used a "ruse" to 
gain entrance to the premises. Commonwealth v Martinelli 1999 PA Super 92. Reviewing 
the similarities attendant to that case and the instant case it is noted that: 
"On the day the warrant was executed, Detective Sassa, accompanied 
by other officers, went up to the door of Defendant's apartment and 
knocked. He heard [appellee] say from within, 'who's there?' 
Detective Sassa answered, 'Dave'..." "Seconds elapsed, and then the 
[appellee] then opened her door part way. Detective Sassa said, 
police, search warrant', and instantaneously entered the doorway, 
pushing the door further open as he walked in. ..." 
The trial court, after the suppression hearing, determined that the facts of this case 
were supportive of a ruling suppressing the evidence the Court said, "Detective Sassa 
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failed to wait a reasonable period of time after announcing his identity, authority and 
purpose to permit appellee to surrender the premises peacefully." 
In another case, Commonwealth v Chambers. 528 Pa 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991), we 
find it virtually indistinguishable from the instant case: 
"Robert Chambers began to open the door, simultaneously, the 
police officer pushed the door open, pushing Mr. Chambers 
backwards.. .He identified himself as an officer and stated 
that he had a search warrant for the premises..." 
In the ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania it was held that the evidence 
should be suppressed and the Court observed that in Chambers, supra: 
"In this case, however, consent was not given by the defendant. The 
testimony of the police officer demonstrates that the defendant never 
had an opportunity to giver [her] consent and to voluntarily admit the 
officers to [her] premises. The officers immediately entered the 
premises, forcibly propelling the defendant backwards on entry." 
The pivotal case of Miller v United States. 1958, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S. Ct. 1190,22 L. 
Ed. 2d 1332, later cited when the Court observed in Leahy v United States, 272 F.2d 487 
(1959), "Misrepresentation of identity in order to gain admittance is not breaking within 
the meaning of the statute" [but] "the petitioner, having opened the door part way on an 
attached door chain, attempted to close it upon seeing the officers but they prevented him 
from doing so. The officers ripped the chain off the door in order to gain admittance. The 
court held this constituted a breaking." See also Gatewood v United States, 1953, 93 U.S. 
App. D.C. 226,209 F.2d 789, officers again attempted a ruse to gain entrance. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of record here that the Defendant knew of 
officer's purpose at the time he opened the door slightly, nor is there evidence that the 
police feared for their safety or were concerned that evidence would be destroyed. Had 
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there been any, in the Affidavit presented to the Judge for the search warrant, the Judge 
might well have allowed a "no-knock" provision in the warrant. 
The entry of Officer Simonson and the other officers, even accepting contentions 
with respect to "knock and announce" at the main door, it is clear that when the detective 
identified himself as "Dennis" twice prior to entry without allowing a reasonable amount 
of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without force violated the 
spirit of the law.T.P.4 Line 14-25 "An officer [can] enter a residence only if, after giving 
notice of his or her authority or purposes, the officer is 'not admitted with reasonable 
promptness." State v Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)(quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-
23-210). The Utah Supreme Court had held that a determination of what constitutes 
"reasonable promptness" must be made under all the circumstances present in a given 
search. 
In the case of Richards v Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) the court held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce 
requirement for felony drug investigations. 
"First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization. 
For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special 
risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug 
investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For 
example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only 
individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug 
activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy 
evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for 
were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy 
quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in 
preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the 
individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry. 
Wisconsin's blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cased from 
judicial review. 
A second difficulty with permitting a criminal category exception 
to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating 
an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to 
others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to 
have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without 
too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each 
category of criminal investigation that included a considerable - albeit 
hypothetical - risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the 
knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement would be meaningless." 
When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite to force in executing a warrant 
is outlined in Utah Statute 77-23-210: When a search warrant has been issued authorizing 
entry into any building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer 
executing the warrant may use force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not 
admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not gibe notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm 
may result to any person if notice were given. 
The FOURTH AMENDMENT [U.S. Constitution] - The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.1 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in their denial to suppress the evidence that was gathered after 
an unlawful entry. The police officers forced their way into the Defendant's residence 
without first adhering to the "knock and wait" rule. There were no exigent circumstances 
that would permit the conduct at issue. 
Wherefore the Defendant requests that the Appellate Court reverse the trial court's 
decision and grant the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. 
Dated this /% day of September, 2005 
David M. Perry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this f3 day of dtyM^A . 2005,1 caused to copies of the 
foregoing appellate brief to be delivered to the following: 
Mathew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0804 
ADDENDUM 
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BRUCE WARD, UBN 7666 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
11 WEST 100 NORTH 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
TELEPHONE: (435) 716-8361 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ORDER DENYING MOTI ON 
Plaintiff, TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. 
Case No. 041100017 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI, 
Defendant. Judge Thomas Willmore 
It is hereby, ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is, for 
reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 15 July 2004, DENIED. The 
warrant was executed on the defendant's residence in a reasonable and legal manner. 
Furthermore, it was executed between 8:00 and 8:30 PM which is within the statutory 
definition of "daytime service." See, Utah Code anno. 77-23-201. 
DATED this %(p day of July, 2004 
ADDENDUM 
—B— 
u 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff, * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
v. * 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI, * Case No: 041100017 FS 
Defendant. * 
* 
This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Each party filed a 
memorandum in support of their positions on the motion. A hearing was held on May 18,2004. 
At the hearing, Mr. Herschi testified together with Detective Dennis Simonson and Deputy Bill 
Nyberg. 
There are two issues raised in Defendant's Motion to Suppress. First, what constitutes 
"knock and announce" by an officer in serving a search warrant? Second, is serving a warrant at 
8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"? 
1. What constitutes knock and announce by an officer while serving a search warrant? 
On January 6,2004, Officer Simonson obtained a search warrant for Defendant's house. 
Defendant does not contest the validity of the search warrant. Defendant only contests the 
execution of the search warrant. 
The search warrant was served on Defendant's residence on January 6,2004, between 
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. The warrant was served by Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg. Many of 
the facts on how the warrant was served are not disputed by the Defendant. The witnesses agree 
that Detective Simonson knocked on the door to the residence. A male voice from inside the 
house responded by asking "Who is it?" Detective Simonson answered "Dennis." The male voice 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 041100017 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail A. W. LAURITZEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
15 E 600 N 
P.O. BOX 171 
LOGAN, UT 84321-0171 
Mail BRUCE WARD 
ATTORNEY PLA 
11 W 100 N 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Dated this /& day of 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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flfcf; 
FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
»£0 JAH2i 
% 
STATS OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOSHUA G HERSCHI, 
Defendant 
Custody: Prison 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041100017 FS 
Judge: THOMAS WILLMORE 
Date: January 18, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lesliec 
Prosecutor: WARD, BRUCE G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 19, 1984 
Video 
Tape Count: 3 : 56 
CHARGES 
POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/16/2004 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/16/2004 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/16/2004 
POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED -
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/16/2004 
USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA -
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/16/2004 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
{Guilty Plea} 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
(Guilty Plea} 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
(Guilty Plea} 
3rd Degree Felony 
(Guilty Plea} 
Class A Misdemeanor 
(Guilty Plea} 
Page 1 
>Case Nor 041100017 
Date: Jan 18, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRF-T SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY 
RESTRICTED a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentence will run concurrent. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 3 65 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 
Page 2 
Case No:- 041100017 
Date: Jan 18, 2005 
365 day(s). 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Defendant will serve an indeterminate term in jail not to exceed 1 
year. After serving 8 months in jail, he can be released to enter 
the Northern Utah Community Correctional Center. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $1162.16 
Due: $2500.00 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
v-narge # 4 
Charge # 5 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $1162.16 
Total Principal Due: $2500.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
Upon successful completion of the NUCCC program, the entire fine 
will be suspended. 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fine will be paid through Adult Probation and Parole on a schedule 
set up by probation. 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
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Date Jan 18, 2005 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No association with known criminals, drug dealers or users. 
Defendant will enter into agreement with Probation and abide by all 
terms and conditions. 
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol 
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to random search and seizure. 
Submit to alcohol & drug testing and urinalysis upon request of law 
enforcement, probation officer or substance abuse counselor. 
Undergo a mental health evaluation and complete long term 
psychological counseling plus any other recommended treatment, 
including medications. 
Take all medications as prescribed. 
Abide by a 7-00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew. This may be adjusted at 
the discretion of his probation officer. 
Complete all recommended aftercare drug and alcohol treatment. 
Attend 2 AA/NA meetings per week. 
Pay for incarceration. 
SKS seized will be forfeited to the seizing agency. 
Defendant will have a written statement m his wallet on his 
fridge and by his bed about his attitude and willingness to change. 
Successfully complete the NUCCC substance abuse program. Failure 
to complete this program will result in the Defendant being sent to 
the Utah State Prison. 
Dated this ^Jj day of (JCjAA< , 2 0 Q^T 
Page 4 (last) 
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Dtun 
A. W. Lauritzen (1906) 
Attorney at Law/Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
APR 1 2 20C4 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI ; 
Defendant, ] 
> AMENDED VERIFIED 
> MEMORANDUM 
> IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
> SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
• Case No. 041100017 
» Judge Thomas L. Willmore 
CACHE COUNTY 
§ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT with this his Memorandum in Support of his Motion 
To Suppress Evidence seized on or about the 6lh day of January, 2004 in Cache County, State of 
Utah and alleges: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts as per Defendants statement: 
1. On the evening of January 6, 2004 Defendant was in his apartment located at 408 
West 100 South, North Unit TLW, Logan, Utah. His girlfriend, Brooke Staggie was in the 
1 
kitchen preparing supper. Defendant was in the living room rocking their 2 month old daughter, 
Taya in a rocking chair. At approximately 8:30 pm. there was a knock on the door. The 
Defendant called out while still sitting in the rocking chair, "Who's is it?" to which he received a 
response, "Dennis", being confused as to who Dennis might be he called out a second time, 
"Who's is it?", again the response was "Dennis". This further confused the Defendant, not 
knowing a Dennis, he supposed that someone had the wrong apartment and got up out of the 
rocking chair, still holding the baby in his arms and went over and opened the door about 4 
inches. Immediately, the door was shoved open and many men pushed their way into the 
apartment. The door was pushed open with such force, that the Defendant had to keep the baby's 
head from being hit by the door. At no time prior to the bursting into the apartment with force, 
did the Defendant know that the persons outside his door were police officers. There was no 
announcement that the caller was actually Officer Dennis Simonson, or that he had a search 
warrant or that there were various other officers outside with him. Upon forcing entry, the 
Defendant was forcefully pushed toward the floor, having one hand brought behind him while 
still holding the baby. Defendant's first thoughts were that he was going to be beat up, because 
he only saw plain clothes on the men he saw through the partially open door. It wasn't until about 
the fourth officer came through the door that the officer said," he's holding a baby" and took the 
baby from the Defendant. Upon getting the Defendant's arms behind his back and in cuffs, and 
sitting the Defendant in the rocking chair, a shorter, bald, stocky officer told the Defendant that 
they had a search warrant and asked the Defendant if he'd like to see it. Whereupon the 
Defendant answered "Yes" and the officer set the warrant on his lap as Defendant's hands were 
cuffed behind him. 
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2. Shortly, the girlfriend and mother of the baby, Brooke, came into the living room 
and asked to have the baby and was given the baby by the officer. 
3. The search was executed at that time. At no time was the Defendant given the 
opportunity to acknowledge the police or their reason for being at his door. At no time was the 
Defendant read his miranda rights or told that he was under arrest. A uniformed officer came in 
later and was told by Officer Simonson to take the Defendant to jail, whereupon the Defendant 
was removed from the premises and transported to the jail. Defendant was not read his rights at 
the jail, only searched and put into a holding cell. 
4. Defendant was, on January 7, 2004, charged by information (Exhibit A) with 
five counts of criminal conduct. An amended information was later filed, see (Exhibit B). 
ISSUES 
I. WAS THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT SUFFICIENTLY 
COMPLIED WITH TO SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
AS ENUNCIATED IN KER V. CALIFORNIA 
II. DOES THE STANDARD IN UTAH CASES PROVIDE A DISTINCTION 
WHICH WOULD RATIFY THE CONDUCT EMPLOYED BY THE 
OFFICER SERVING THE WARRANT IN VIEW OF: 
A. DECEPTION 
B. TIME INTERVAL 
II WHETHER UTAH AND FEDERAL STANDARDS RESPECTING 
NIGHTTIME SEARCHES ARE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION. 
DISCUSSION 
POINT I. WAS THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT 
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AS 
3 
ENUNCIATED IN KER V. CALIFORNIA 
5. Implicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is a recognition of certain guarantees of individual freedom extended to all persons 
within the United States of America. That safeguard has been declared to be "...the very essence 
of constitutional liberty [the guaranty of which] is as important and as imperative as are the 
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen ..." Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) as quoted in Ker v. California 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623,10 L. Ed. 2d 
726(1963). The language of the amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects 
all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends 
to protected premises wherein a search was made. 
6. It is the method of entry that is the first question presented by this case. In cases 
construing the Fourth Amendment, it has long been recognized that holdings addressing the 
lawfulness of an arrest with respect to federal prosecutions is to be extended to prosecutions 
understate law. See Miller vs. United States 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958), Mapp vs. Ohio 367 U.S. 
643 (1961), cf Wolfe vs. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 27(1948). 
7. Various statutes provide that peace officers, in order to break into a dwelling place 
for the purpose of service of Warrant, be it for arrest or authorizing a search, must first demand 
admittance and explain their purpose; these statutes find their impetus in cases construing the 
constitutional provision. Whether the requirement was fully satisfied in the instant case by the 
methods employed by Plaintiff must be analyzed in light of current law. It is of primary 
importance that constitutional guarantees be enforced so as to prevent unreasonable invasions of 
the repose of persons, as to their homes and/or papers and/or effects. 
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8. Reasonableness, as defined with respect to the Fourth Amendment, is a concept 
developed in the laboratory provided by many decades of federal litigation. It is generally held 
that state searches and seizures are to be subjected, by the Supremacy Clause, to the same 
analysis as that developed in the federal system.1 
9. Defendant maintains here that the officer failed to adequately identify himself 
and/or announce his mission before intruding by exertion of force to open Defendants door. It is 
firmly established that an announcement by police officers of purpose and authority before 
breaking into an individual's home is no mere procedural nicety or formality, but is necessitous 
preamble prior to the service and execution of a warrant. Decisions in both the federal and state 
courts have recognized, as did the English courts, that those requirements are of the essence with 
respect to the substantive protections which safeguard individual liberty. 
POINT II. DOES THE STANDARD IN UTAH CASES PROVIDE A 
DISTINCTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE CONDUCT EMPLOYED BY THE 
OFFICER THROUGH USE OF DECEPTION AND/OR INSUFFICIENT TIME 
INTERVAL. 
10. The "knock and announce' rule originated in the English common law and was 
adopted early on by Courts of the United States. Both the Pennsylvania Court, (See 
Commonwealth v. Martinelli 1999 PA Super 92), and the United States Supreme Court have 
held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures may 
apply to the manner of a warrant's execution.2 Absent exigent circumstances, an announcement 
as to both authority and purpose is required. 
1
 Barring more restrictive state doctrine. 
2
 A fairly detailed history is found in the text of the opinion handed down in Ker v. 
California (supra). 
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11. The purpose of the "knock and announce" doctrine is variously and generally said 
to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and to occupants of the protected premises, 
to protect an occupant's privacy from the anticipation of unauthorized entry by unknown persons, 
and to prevent unnecessary property damage resulting from forced entry. 
12. The Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994) 
that an unjustified violation of the " knock and announce" statute constitutes a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and warrants suppression of any evidence obtained as a result. The Court of 
Appeals specifically held that where there is no legitimate justification for a violation of the 
statute, a Defendant is not required to demonstrate a factual basis for damage pursuant to any 
violation of any interests protected by the statute. Id. at 412. 
13. A failure to "knock and announce' can only be justified if there are exigent 
circumstances. Exigent circumstances might include a reasonable fear for officer safety or a 
reasonable fear that there is a legitimate concern for destruction of evidence. Id. 412-13 
14. This case might well be likened to another case where an officer used a ruse to 
gain entrance to the premises. Commonwealth v. Martinelli (Supra). Reviewing the similarities 
attendant to that case and the instant case it is noted that: 
"On the day the warrant was executed, Detective Sassa, accompanied 
by other officers, went up to the door of Defendant's apartment and 
knocked. He heard [appellee] say from within," who's there?" Detective 
Sassa answered "Dave". ..." 
"Seconds elapsed, and the[appellee] then opened her door part way. 
Detective Sassa said, "police, search warrant', and instantaneously 
entered the doorway, pushing the door further open as he walked in...." 
15. The trial court, after the suppression hearing, determined that the facts of this case 
were supportive of a ruling suppressing the evidence the Court said," Detective Sassa failed to 
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wait a reasonable period of time after announcing his identity, authority and purpose to permit 
appellee to surrender the premises peacefully." 
16. In another case, Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991), 
we find it virtually indistinguishable from the instant case: 
"Robert Chambers began to open the door, Simultaneously, the 
police officer pushed the door open, pushing Mr. Chambers 
backwards....He identified himself as an officer and stated that he 
had a search warrant for the premises...." 
17. In the ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania it was held that the evidence 
should be suppressed and the Court observed that in Chambers, supra: 
"In this case, however, consent was not given by [appellee]. The 
testimony of the police officer demonstrates that [appellee] never 
had an opportunity to give [her] consent and to voluntarily admit 
the officers to [her] premises. The officers immediately entered the 
premises, forcibly propelling [appellee] backwards on entry."3 
18. The pivotal case of Miller v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 2 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, later cited when that Court observed in Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 
(1959), "Misrepresentation of identity in order to gain admittance is not a breaking within the 
meaning of the statute" [but] "the petitioner, having opened the door part way on an attached 
door chain, attempted to close it upon seeing the officers but they prevented him from doing so. 
The officers ripped the chain off the door in order to gain admittance. The court held this 
constituted a breaking." See also Gatewood v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 226, 209 
F.2d 789, officers again attempted a ruse to gain admittance. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of record here that Defendant knew of officer's purpose at the 
time he opened the door slightly, not is there evidence of record that the police feared for their safety or were 
concerned that evidence would be destroyed. Had there been any, in the Affidavit presented to the Judge for the 
Search Warrant, the Judge might well have allowed a " No-Knock" provision in the warrant. 
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19. The entry of Officer Simonson and the other officers, even accepting 
contentions with respect to "knock and announce" at the main door, it is clear that when the 
detective identified himself as "Dennis" twice prior to entry without allowing a reasonable 
amount of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without force violated 
the spirit of the law. " An officer [can] enter a residence only if, after giving notice of his or her 
authority or purposes, the officer is 'not admitted with reasonable promptness." State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-23-210). The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a determination of what constitutes "reasonable promptness' must be made 
under all the circumstances present in a given search. 
20. It should be noted that the State, through the Attorney General's Office, suggested 
to the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman that the court interprets "reasonable promptness" to 
establish a minimum waiting time of thirty seconds before officers can enter. Thurman(Supra at 
1256) The court rejected a strict time minimum, but this time frame suggested by the State may 
provide some guidance in this case. See also United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 
2001) (officers complied with requirements of Fourth Amendment when "they knocked, 
announced their presence, and waited approximately a minute before attempting to enter [the] 
residence forcefully.") 
POINT III. WHETHER UTAH OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD RESPECTING NIGHTTIME SEARCHES ARE THE SAME. 
18. The Founding fathers of the United States Constitution, as having been previously 
citizens of England had a great abhorrence to "Nighttime searches", which presented itself in the 
fact that in England the Kings men OFTEN ENTERED A home and roused the out of their beds 
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in the process of various civil and criminal investigations. This so incensed the Founding fathers 
that they deemed this issue to be of constitutional dimension. This had not only happened in 
England, the practice continued in America before the war of independence. There was a 
particularly strong hostility to nighttime searches of a persons home. 
5. Nighttime searches were regarded with revulsion because of the indignity of 
rousing people from their beds. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 535, 541, 
495 N.E. 2d 328(1986). The underlying rationale was that nighttime police intrusion posed a 
great threat to privacy, violated the sanctity of home and endangered the police and slumbering 
citizens. See 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.7(b). When the violation has gone beyond 
a procedural rule, with its attendant potential for a miscarriage of justice, imposition of the 
doctrine of suppression should be imposed based on ," (1) the degree to which the violation 
undermined the principles underlying the governing rule of law ... and (2) the extent to which 
exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated in the future" Commonwealth v. 
Gomes(citations omitted) as quoted in Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 413 Mass. 73 (1992). 
20. Utahns, of all of the residents of the various States in the Union, probably have 
more reason to be aggrieved by the actions of law enforcement in connection with search and 
seizures. Certainly the connection many Utah people have and had with the prosecution and 
imprisonment of their forebears in polygamy cases would lead Utahns to concerns which might 
be ordinarily thought to be of no great import in sibling states4 The Poland Act of 1874 actually 
seemed to kick off a period of polygamy prosecutions and convictions and the "Raids" (usually 
4It is universally assumed that the Morrill Antibigamy Act of 1962 focused exclusively on 
Utah Polygamy practices. 
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warrantless) peaked in the period of 1884 thru 1889.5 
21. It has recently become evident that the states must express their own analysis, 
Mapp v. Ohio (supra) and the subsequent Federal cases, and created statutes that would routinely 
exclude unlawfully procured evidence. Later, the Utah Court held that Utah had by action and 
implication adopted a rule of law that when evidence used against the Defendant has been 
acquired in violation of constitutional guarantees, its exclusion is inevitably required. At present, 
many of the states have independently adopted a state constitutional Exclusionary Rule. 
22. While a good many of the concerns were on account of entries during the night 
time, it was not uncommon that family members were held virtually hostage in their homes and 
curtailed in their activities on account of the authorities unflagging campaign to flush out the 
suspects.6 
23. Interestingly, when renewed efforts by authorities with regard to prosecution 
of Polygamy, a good many of the Utah citizenry became outraged by the events of the mid-
twentieth century with respect to an invasion of small Southern Utah and Northern Arizona 
towns by Law Enforcement of two states. 
24. A second important area of the development of Utah Law with respect to search & 
seizure is the fact that the Utah Courts have not only ascribed special concerns to Utah and 
Utahns based on a singular history but have closely scrutinized sister state decisions ascribing 
different interpretations to constitutional provisions remarkably similar in text to Federal 
5Tracy E. Panek search and seizure in Utah recounting the antipolygamy raids, 62 UT. 
Quarterly 316(1994) 
6See Generally Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground St. Ut. Hist. 
Quarterly 133(1983) 
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constitutional provisions.7 There is an active dispute as to the actual number of states where 
there is separate interpretations of rules governing search and seizures between the state and 
federal constitutions, however in State of New Mexico v. Daniel Garcia, cert denied, No. 27, 
455, April 26, 2002, the Appeals Court assumed " without deciding, that the analysis is the same 
under both constitutions." 
CONCLUSION 
18. Only a "fundamental" violation of criminal procedure requires automatic 
suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' only where it, in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards. The Utah court has rejected 
the idea that suppression should be limited only to instances where personal injury or property 
damage 'actually occurred and has further rejected the notion that a search is made legal by what 
it turns up. The officers in this case failed to knock and identify their authority and purpose. The 
occupant was not given opportunity to respond, which increased the risk of violence at the time 
of the entry. A fundamental violation of defendant's rights occurred , the Officers actions 
violated State, constitutional and procedural statutes. Therefore^Defendant moves this court to 
grant the Motion to Suppress the Evidence from the Search yVarrant. 
Dated this &_ day of April, 2004. 
7This was part of the rationale of the Utah Court in providing a St\te Constitution basis 
for imposition of the Exclusionary Rule in Larocco. 
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A.W. Catfritzen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to the 
person(s) listed below on this the^|' day ofMafeh; 2004. 
N. GEORGE DAINES 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
11 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84 
408 W 100 South, North Unit 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
Your Affiant is Detective Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson, a police officer with the Logan City Police 
Department in Logan, Utah. Y'our Affiant has been so employed for over 20 years and is currently 
assigned as a supervisor of the Cache/Rich Drug Task Force. Your Affiant is a graduate of the Utah 
Police Academy and has received continual training in the investigation of all manner of criminal 
activity. Your Affiant has received specialized training in the investigation of controlled substance 
use, production, and distribution. 
Your Affiant is currently investigating Joshua G. Herschi, DOB 02-19-84 for Possession of 
Controlled Substances, to wit rnethamphetamine and marijuana, Utah Code 58-37-8. Joshua is 
currently living at 408 W 100 South. Logan. UT. This is a 'duplex' residence created from an 
original single family home in Logan, UT. The Herschi portion of the residence is accessed at 
the street level entrance from the north of this white house. The house is located at the 
southwest comer of 400 West and 100 South in Logan, due south of the Head Start, Logan 
Center at 75 South 400 West, Logan. 
The facts tending to establish grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows: 
1. On 1-2-04, Your Affiant received information from a concerned citizen regarding illegal 
drug use and distribution involving Joshua G. Herschi at 408 W 100 S, Logan, This 
concerned citizen (CC) wished to remain confidential for personal reasons. However, 
this person identified themself to Your Affiant and is a resident of Cache Valley. 
2. CC stated that they had personal knowledge that Joshua Herschi has been distributing 
marijuana and rnethamphetamine to various residents of Cache Valley for months, and 
was willing to assist in the investigation by pointing out involved residences and naming 
involved and suspected persons. T>R06S t t 3 £ 5 Sou> iLW*&4U.«j OM i 1,-1*6-03 
3. By way of background knowledge on the suspect, CC stated that Joshua lives at the 
residence with Brooke and her 2-month old baby girl. Joshua is employed at Harrington 
& Co. in Hyrurn and has no vehicle. Visitors and 'customers' at the residence were 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
named as "Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, Katie and Eric Fletcher, 
and Carlene, about 50 years of age with brown hair, from the Trenton area. CC has 
personally observed drug transactions inside the residence. CC pointed out 2 additional 
residences to Your Affiant involved with this group. (One of these residences will go 
unidentified in this affidavit, as the names associated with license numbers of vehicles 
observed by Your Affiant at that residence on 1-5-04 are drug-related and will be the 
subject of a separate drug investigation.) 
4. CC provided Your Affiant with a floor plan of Joshua's one bedroom residence. CC has 
personal knowledge of a mid-sized Fire-Safe in the bedroom closet in which CC has 
observed several baggies of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 
5. Your Affiant's personal investigation confirmed via LCPD computer files that Joshua 
Herschi resides at 408 W 100 South, Logan. His data also reflects that he was arrested for 
Distribution of Marijuana in January of 2001. 
6. CC stated that Robert Elsbury and Elizabeth Smith are transient people in the valley and 
that they purchase drugs from Joshua. On 1-5-04, 1940 hours, during surveillance, Your 
Affiant observed a tan 1976 GM Van, license number 864MNF, stop at Joshua's 
residence. The vehicle's occupants entered and then left 8-10 minutes later. There were 
two persons in the van which was registered to Robert Elsbury. LCPD computer files 
reflect that he is a drug user. 
7. CC pointed out a residence at 896 W 600 South, Logan and stated the uLinda" lives there 
with her father and obtains methamphetamine from Joshua. Your Affiant has personally 
had drug-related contacts with Linda and is aware that this residence is the home of Linda 
Hyden Folia and that she has methamphetamine involvement history. Your Affiant also 
knows that her father was the owner of the house. 
8. CC mentioned "Carlene" from the Trenton area. Your Affiant believes that this Carlene 
is Carlene Fite, a current resident of Trenton, whom Your Affiant has personally 
investigated for narcotics violations and has an extensive history of methamphetamine 
use and has associated with Linda Hyden Folia. 
9. CC stated that CC suspected cohabitant "Brooke" (last name unknown) of 
methamphetamine use. Your Affiant reviewed LCPD computer data and ascertained that 
Joshua Herschi was named in an assault incident as a boyfriend of Brooke Staggi. Your 
Affiant observed a 1997 Mazda, license number 157LYA, registered toKrista Staggi at 
the residence on 1-5-04. Brooke's identity was confirmed by Your Affiant. 
10. Your Affiant believes that the information provided by CC is accurate and reliable, as CC 
provided CCsadentification and contact information. CC has also provided information 
that has been verified - nothing has proven inaccurate. Your Affiant noted also that this 
information was derived by firsthand knowledge. 
11. Your Affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant of 
Joshua G. Herschi, his residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, located at 408 W 
100 South, Logan. Your Affiant also requests to search any of the above named 
individuals and their respective vehicles if they are present at-the time of service of the 
search warrant. 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
This is based on the aforementioned facts and circumstances. 
DATED ON THIS THE DAY OF JANUARY 
%?v**— 
Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson 
Cache/Rich Drug Task Force 
& SWORN TO. AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS THE J £ _ DAY OF JANUARY, 
2004. 
J_ V, 
JUDGE 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit 
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DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84 
408W100 South,, tvotm 
Logan, UT 84321 
Defendant 
u^r^ 
1 
i 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. i 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF CACH E, STATE 
OF UTAH: 
Proof of affidavit was made before me this day by Sergeant Dennis Simonson that there is probable 
cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit on file with the District 
Court. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, during daytime hours, with 
the necessity of giving previous notice of: 
1. Joshua G. Herschi, Brooke Staeeu their Residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, 
located at 408 W 100 S o u t h ^ L ^ n ^ ^ I j ™ :iant also requests to search any of the 
named individuals in the affidavit (*cLinda'\ "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, 
Katie and Eric Fletcher, and "Carlene") and their respective vehicles if they are present at 
the time of service of the search warrant or immediately preceding the service of the 
search warrant 
FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY: 
Any methamphetamine or marijuana material, and any tools, devices, instruments, or other 
controlled substances, or any written documents pertaining to the use of, and/or distribution of any 
controlled substance prohibited by the Utah Controlled Substance Act Also any dominion and 
control papers, computer records, effects, keys, photographs, and any other items which tends to 
prove ownership of said property; which property or evidence: was unlawfully acquired, is 
unlawfully possessed, or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, and/or consists of an 
item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, to wit; 
Possession and/or Distribution of a Controlled Substance to wit methamphetamine or 
marijuana, in violation of section 58-37-8, UCA, and/or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 1 of 2 
violation of section 58-37 A-5, UCA. 
If you find any of the property described above, or any part thereof, bring it before me immediately 
at this court and make a return within 10 days, as required by U.CA. 77-23-7 and 77-23-9. 
DATE SIGNED: {Jo(M\ l*J*sy <S>( 2 ^ TIME SIGNED: <$', (0 f, *>), 
JUDGE 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 2 of 2 
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Page 1 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI, 
Defendant 
Case No. 041100017 
Transcript of Videotape, 
Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing, 
Honorable Thomas L. Willmore presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Logan, Utah 
May 18, 2004 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: BRUCE G. WARD 
Deputy County Attorney 
For the Defendant A. W. LAURITZEN 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. 0. Box 873 
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
Page 2 
1 THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Joshua G. Herschi, 
2 case number 041100017. Counsel, please state your names for 
31 the record. 
4 MR. WARD: Bruce Ward for the state. 
5 MR. LAURITZEN: A. W. Lauritzen for the defendant, 
6 who is seated next to me. 
7 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. This is the time 
8 set for a hearing on a motion to suppress that Mr. Lauritzen 
9 has filed in behalf of Mr. Herschi. The state has responded 
10 to that. Any opening statements, counsel? 
11 MR. LAURITZEN: I think not. I prefer to just 
12 present a little bit of evidence and go right into the 
13 J argument. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. WARD: The state is the same. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Your first witness. 
17 MR. LAURITZEN: Joshua Herschi. 
18 JOSHUA HERSCHI, 
191 being first duly sworn, was examined and 
201 testified as follows: 
21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. LAURITZEN: 
23 Q. State your name, please. 
24 A. Joshua Grant Herschi. 
25 Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Herschi? 
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WARD: No objection. 
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A. 
Q. 
Umm, yeah. Not very far. 
On the other side of the door you saw two men? 
I saw many men. I saw more than two. 
All right. And the one that was standing immediately in 
door, you saw his badge pinned to his chest? 
I did not. I don't think he had it on his --- he had a 
ket on. That's all I saw. 
A jacket? 
He had a coat on. 
You don't think he had a badge? 
Not on his jacket, no. I didn't see a badge on him at 
You heard him say police? 1 
No. 
You heard him say search warrant? J 
No. 
On seeing these men, and after they had stated these I 
things, you attempted to close the door? J 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
You did not try to push the door shut? 1 
No. 
So you opened the door the rest of the way for them? 
No. I opened the door and it was shoved open further. 
MR. WARD: I don't have any other questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen. 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. LAURITZEN: 
Again, is your version of the events contained in exhibit 
or exhibit one, which has been introduced into evidence? 
Excuse me? 
The version that you say actually happened is what's in 
exhibit one, which is in evidence now? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
In the statement of facts? 
Yes. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Any other questions, Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Herschi. Any 
other witnesses, Mr. Lauritzen? 
BY 
Q. 
A. 
MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
THE COURT: Anything from the state? 
MR. WARD: We call Sergeant Dennis Simonson. 
DENNIS SIMONSON, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. WARD: 
State your name, please. 
Dennis Simonson. 
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1 Q. And you're the sergeant over the narcotics task force at 
2 Logan City PD? 
3 A. I am. 
4 Q. On January 6th, 2004, you served a warrant on the 
5 residence occupied by Joshua Herschi? 
6 A. I did. 
7 Q. About what time of night was that? 
8 A. 8:30 p.m. 
9 Q. And tell us how you served that warrant. 
10 A. I went up to the door. Immediately behind me was Agent 
11 Bill Nyberg, who is present in the court. I knocked on the 
12 door. There was a voice inside who asked who is it. I said 
13 Dennis. There was a pause. The person again said who. I 
14 said Dennis. A few seconds later, or several seconds later, 
15 the door opened partially. Approximately, I'd say, about 12, 
16 15, maybe 18 inches. A male was standing in the door who is 
17 present in the courtroom today, Mr. Herschi. He looked at 
18 1 me. And if I may take the liberty of placing this coat on 
19 for the court? 
20 Q. Were you wearing a jacket? 
21 A. I was. 
22 Q. Did you bring that same jacket to the courtroom today? 
23 A. I did. 
24 Q. Would you please demonstrate how you were wearing it? 
25 A. Thank you. 
Page 8 
II Q. I notice that you have a badge on the front of the 
2 jacket. Is that the way it was clipped to your jacket that 
3 night? 
4 A. Within an inch or two, yes, right there. Itfs located 
5 approximately six to eight inches from my chin. 
6 Q. When Mr. Herschi opened the door what, if anything, did 
7 you say? 
8 A. I said police, search warrant. I said it loudly. 
9 Q. You did say it loudly? 
10 A. Right. At that point, within a fraction -- well, not a 
11 fraction of a second, but almost instantaneously the door 
12 started to come forward, pushing closed. I pushed forward on 
13 the door and there was resistance on the back side. Agent 
14 Nyberg assisted me. We both pushed on the door until I 
15 managed to slip in and work my way around to what would be 
16 the defendant's right side. 
17 Q. Who else was on the porch with you besides Agent Nyberg? 
18 A. I just recall Agent Nyberg. There were other officers in 
191 the area who were going to assist in the search warrant who 
20 maybe came up, but I wasn't aware of where they were placed. 
21 Agent Nyberg and I were assigned to make the initial 
22 approach. Others may have been close, but I did not see them 
23 because my attention was diverted to the door and trying to 
24 get into the residence. 
25 MR. WARD: I don't have any other questions. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen. 
2 MR. LAURITZEN: Nothing. 
3 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. Anything 
4 further, Mr. Ward? 
5 MR. WARD: The state calls Agent Bill Nyberg. 
6 WILLIAM NYBERG, 
7 being first duly sworn, was examined and 
8 testified as follows: 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. WARD: 
111 Q. Tell us your name, please. 
12 A. William Nyberg. 
13 1 Q. And you're a deputy for the Cache County sheriff's 
14 department? 
15 A. I am. 
16 Q. And you're currently assigned to the Cache/Rich drug task 
17 force? 
18 A. I am. 
19 Q. Did you assist in serving a search warrant at the house 
20 of Joshua Herschi on January 6th, 2004? 
21 A. I did. 
22 Q. Where were you when that warrant was served? 
23 A. I was standing on the front porch next to Sergeant 
241 Simonson. 
25 Q. Who was on the front porch with you and Sergeant 
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lj MR. LAURITZEN: What we're dealing with here are 
2 1 certainly nuances and minutia, but they are very critical to 
31 this particular case. I have cited United States 
4| constitutional cases and state cases which support my view. 
51 I suggest that they1re directly on point with no difference 
6 that can be ascertained. 
71 The state has come up with a case that they contend is on 
81 point, but it is not. The only case they come up with which 
91 they say supports their view is a case where an officer 
101 approached the door, knocked, and when asked who it was 
111 responded maintenance man. The person inside the premises 
121 opened the door slightly, ascertained that it was in fact the 
131 police, slammed the door. And the police again began rapping 
14 on the door saying police, search warrant, et cetera, et 
15 cetera. The individual did not then answer the door. 
16 At that point the police forced their way in, broke the 
17 1 door down, and entered the premises and found that the person 
181 in the premises was in fact attempting to leave by some other 
191 exit. And ultimately, on a thorough search of the house, 
201 were able to find some drugs. 
21 That case is not on all fours with this case here because 
221 the individual closed the door. He was given an opportunity 
231 thereafter to respond to the police, who demanded entry by 
24 J knocking on the door, announcing their purpose and authority, 
25 and did not do so. The police then were able to force the 
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1 door. This is not the case here. In this particular case 
2 1 the police opened — the police obtained the opening of the 
31 door by a ruse. Now, that doesn't just foreclose everything 
4 1 from that point on. I can't say, since they used a ruse to 
51 get the door open, they are then out of luck, they have 
61 violated the defendant's constitutional rights. 
7 THE COURT: Officer Simonson didn't lie, did he? 
8 MR. LAURITZEN: He did not. 
91 THE COURT: Who's there? Dennis. 
101 MR. LAURITZEN: He said he was Dennis. Now, at that 
11 point my contention is he did not state his intention^ or 
12 1 purpose, which is required by the statute. 
131 THE COURT: Okay. What is the purpose — what is 
141 the public purpose oJLJ:he__kniDj3_k_-and___ann.Q_uiice rule? 
15 1 MR. LAURITZEN: To inform the individual that in 
16 fact it is somebody with authority that is attempting to 
17 obtain entry. 
18 1 THE COURT: Okay. So the officer first must knock. 
191 And they knocked. There's no question, no dispute, that 
201 Officer Simonson knocked? 
21 MR. LAURITZEN: He did. 
221 THE COURT: Then the next .question becomes they must 
23 announce, right? 
24 I MR. LAURITZEN: That is right. 
251 THE COURT: I guess the issue in this case becomes 
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lj what constitutes an announcement by the officer? 
2 J MR. LAURITZEN: That is right. 
31 THE COURT: So in other words what must the officer 
4 say? 
5 MR. LAURITZEN: That's right. 
61 THE COURT: Are you arguing, Mr. Lauritzen, that 
7 they must say certain things before the door opens or before 
8 1 they gain entry? 
9 MR. LAURITZEN: They are required under the statute 
10 J to say certain things before the door opens. 
11 THE COURT: Voluntarily opening the door does not 
12 matter? 
13 MR. LAURITZEN: No. Because if an individual 
14 knowingly and willingly allows entry, then --
15 1 THE COURT: I'm not talking about entry. Opening 
16 the door? 
17 MR. LAURITZEN: When an individual opens the door 
18 1 that in fact is not a breaking. That is not a breaking 
191 under -- just because he opens the door regardless -- they 
20 1 can say I have a bazooka trained on your door and if you 
21 don!t open the door in three minutes we're going to fire 
22 through it. If he opens the door, he opens the door even 
23 though in fact there's just a peace officer standing there. 
24 That is not -- I mean, if he voluntarily opens the door, then 
251 at that point, as we all know when we open the door, we have 
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1 the right to either admit someone or not admit someone. The 
2 fact is that the opening of the door does not, ipso facto, 
3 allow anyone to enter your home. 
4 THE COURT: Correct. The question then becomes is 
51 the officer -- the officer needs to announce who he is and 
6 what he's there for at that point in time? 
7 MR. LAURITZEN: Not necessarily at that point in 
8 time. What Ifm saying, at that point in time he opens the 
9| door and sees an officer there and he elects to close the 
10 door as opposed allowing the officer -- no matter what the 
11 officer says, if he elects to close the door then he must at 
12 that point, within a very short time, 15, 20 seconds or 
13 1 whatever, he then has the duty to open the door again. But 
14 he does not surrender his rights by merely opening the door. 
15 THE COURT: Isn't this case here, Mr. Herschi's 
16 case, hinging upon whether or not when that door opened 
17 1 Detective Simonson said Officer Simonson, search warrant? 
18 MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
19 THE COURT: Your client is saying no, that was not 
20 said? 
21 MR. LAURITZEN: Uh-huh. 
22 THE COURT: He's saying that did not occur, correct? 
23 MR. LAURITZEN: Well, he's saying that, but I don't 
24 think that's the determining factor. I mean, we have a 
25 conflict of facts here, but that is not the determining 
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THE 
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search warrant, 
I know Mr. 
a proper 
even though 
and I don't care 
g at that point 
door. 
there was a 
LAURITZEN: Yeah. And I'm not saying it was 
an affirmative ruse, he just didn 
authority. 
COURT: So your argument is that 
't state his 
the purpose and 
authority must be stated first before the door opens at all? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
LAURITZEN: Yes, absolutely. 
COURT: Okay. 
LAURITZEN: I'm going to just -- in Lahey versus 
United States, which was later repeated in Miller, and you 
find that on page seven of my brief, my amend ed brief, the 
United States Supreme Court said misrepresentation of 
identity in 
the meaning 
order to gain admittance is not a breaking within 
of the statute. But the petitioner, having 
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opened the door part way on an attached door chain, attempted 
to close it upon seeing the officers, but they prevented him 
from doing so. The officers ripped the chain off the door in 
order to gain admittance. The court held that this 
constituted a breaking. 
THE COURT: Okay. The fact that there was a 
misrepresentation and then knocking on the door constituted a 
breaking, or just the fact that they knocked the door in 
constituted a breaking? J 
MR. LAURITZEN: That's it. When they pushed the 
door open against some force that was a breaking, when it was 1 
not preceded by an announcement, a purpose and identity and a 1 
reasonable time. Those are the two factors that they have to J 
have preceding a breaking or forcing of the door. That is 
the critical issue in this case, whether or not there was 
announcement of purpose and identity and a reasonable amount 1 
of time before forcing a closed door. I 
THE COURT: So you're also arguing that if Detective 
Simonson said Detective Simonson, search warrant, they had to 
wait a reasonable amount of time before they pushed that door 
open? 1 
MR. LAURITZEN: Right. That is exactly what the 
case that the state would require would ask the court to J 
honor. The Supreme Court case said where somebody, upon J 
opening the door, being apprised of the authority and 1 
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1 purpose, then closes the door and upon further request 
2 refuses to open it, then the officers may force the door. 
31 THE COURT: So the police have to ask twice? 
4 MR. LAURITZEN: That is right. They have got to ask 
51 twice when they obtain the opening of the door by not stating 
6 their authority and purpose. I briefed those cases and I 
71 really don't think I can add a lot. Itfs in the brief. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Lauritzen. I 
9 understand your argument. Mr. Ward. 
10 MR. WARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Ifm going to be 
111 brief, unless the court has any questions. First, the public 
12 policy behind knock and announce is to avoid any unnecessary 
13 violence or breaking of a door. A police officer has a 
14 search warrant. They go to the door. It's a knock and 
15 1 announce warrant because there is not sufficient evidence for 
161 the court, or issuing magistrate, to have determined that a 
17 no-knock warrant is necessary. They knock on the door. The 
18 whole point at that juncture is to get whoever is inside to 
19 answer so that no evidence is destroyed. No violence at the 
201 front door. 
21 THE COURT: Your argument would be that if somebody 
22 opens the door it does make a difference? 
23 MR. WARD: Absolutely. Here's what you've got. The 
24 cases distinguish this in sort of a roundabout way. You've 
251 got a door, the police knock on it. No answer, no response 
Page 19 
1 from inside at all. It's a knock and announce warrant. 
2 Well, without any response from inside at all, the police 
3 then must say police, search warrant. They can't just go 
4 1 breaking in the door. There might be somebody on the other 
51 side that's willing to answer. 
6 But once they knock on the door, the defendant says who 
7 is it. Dennis. Who? Dennis. The door opens and they say 
8 police, search warrant. At that point the defendant cannot 
9 shove the door closed because that's a violation of all of 
10] our public policy to avoid violence at the front door. 
Ill There's good case law that even if a warrant were found to be 
12 1 defective, whether it's an arrest warrant or a search warrant 
131 or some other type of authorization by the police, you cannot 
14 actively resist the effect of that warrant at that time. 
15 In the case that the state cites from the U.S. Supreme 
16 Court, there wasn't a long wait. Once the defendant on the 
17 1 other side of the hotel room door opens the door and sees a 
18 1 police officer and a maintenance man, who is really a police 
19 officer, he slams the door shut. It's only two or three 
20 seconds. That's almost an immediate effort to break the door 
21 down and they catch him going out the back window. 
22 The other case that the Supreme Court decided, in which 
23 there was a 15 to 20 second wait, they knocked, they 
24 announced, because there had been no answer from inside. 
25 Well, in fact the guy was in the shower. He didn't hear 
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them. Well, they break the door down and he argues they 
didn!t wait long enough. If I could have gotten out of the 
shower and done some other things I could have answered the 
door. The Supreme Court says no. You knock on the door and 
if there's no response, they announce who they are and why 
they're there. If there's still no response an adequate 
period of time is between 15 and 20 seconds, in this 
particular case, and we can go through the door. 
Once Mr. Herschi opened that door, he had no right to 
slam it shut. I think the case law is very clear on that. 
Beyond that, Your Honor, I think the state will stand on 
its brief, unless the court has questions. 
THE COURT: I have no questions. Mr. Lauritzen, let 
me ask you this with regards to your second argument. 
There's been no -- you haven't addressed that with regards to 
daytime, whether 8:30 constitutes daytime? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, with regard to that 
argument, it's the position of the defendant that the 
legislature cannot alter the constitutional rights of an 
individual by statute. I haven't cited a case to that, but I 
suggest that there's a myriad of cases there. 
THE COURT: So even though the statute says up to 
10:00 p.m., your argument is just simply that that's direct 
contravention with the constitution? 
MR. LAURITZEN: That's right. The constitutional 
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1 guarantees that have evolved around the Fourth Amendment. 
2 And particularly the question of nighttime searches are of 
3 such a dimension that you can't just alter them willy-nilly 
4 and somehow magically, by legislative fiat, turn night into 
5 day. And that's what they've done here. 
6 This is a case -- this is something that of course is 
7 novel. It's so novel that other states haven't addressed it, 
8 nor has the federal. I think what the State of Utah did is 
91 follow the United States legislature, or at least some 
10 administrative rule. 
11 THE COURT: Or at least California? 
12 MR. LAURITZEN: Or somebody, yeah. So I searched in 
13 vain for additional case law attempting to resolve this 
14 conundrum of how night can become day because the legislature 
15 says it does. I can't find anything. When I say this is a 
16 case of first impression, I really mean it. I haven't been 
17 able to find a thing. I don't think the state has either. 
181 THE COURT: Do you have any argument you want to 
19 make on that, Mr. Ward? 
20 MR. WARD: No. We'll submit it. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Ifm going to take this under 
22 advisement. I need to look at the cases again. It has been 
23 well briefed. The issues brought up by Mr. Lauritzen have 
24 been well briefed by both sides. I'm going to look at it and 
25 issue a memorandum decision. 
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1 MR. LAURITZEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
2| MR. WARD: Can we go another date for at least a 
3 status hearing so it doesn't fall off the calendar? 
4 THE COURT: Let's go July 27th, 
5 MR. WARD: July or June? 
61 THE COURT: If I can get the memorandum decision 
7 J done sooner we'll move it up, 
MR. LAURITZEN: Was that July? 
91 THE COURT: Yes. July 27th. Just so you know, Mr, 
10 Herschi, the rules give me 60 days to issue a memorandum 
111 decision, 
12 MR. LAURITZEN: 1:30? 
13 THE COURT: Yes. We111 call that a status 
14 conference. If I can get it done sooner I will 
15 MR. LAURITZEN: Thank you, Your Honor 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Do I come to that? 
17 THE COURT: You come on July 22nd, yes. Thank you, 
18 THE BAILIFF: Court's in recess 
19 (Hearing concluded, 
20| 
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23 
24 
25 I 
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